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ABSTRACT 
This essay attempts to demonstrate that it is doubtful if Galileo's famous 
thought experiment concerning falling bodies in his 'Dialogues Concerning Two New 
Sciences' (Galileo  1954: 61-64) actually does succeed in proving that Aristotle was 
wrong in claiming that "bodies of different weight […] move […] with different 
speeds which stand to one another in the same ratio as their weights," (Galileo  1954: 
61). (Part I); and further that it is likewise doubtful that that argument does or even 
can establish Galileo's own famous 'Law of Falling Bodies,' viz., that regardless of 
their weight all bodies fall with the same speed. (Part II) 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Widerlegt Galileo Aristoteles' Theorie des freien Falls? 
 
Aristoteles vertrat bekanntlich die These, "Körper von verschiedenem Ge-
wicht fallen mit Geschwindigkeiten, die im selben Verhältnis zueinander stehen wie 
ihre Gewichte". Mit einem berühmten Gedankenexperiment (aus den 'Dialogues Con-
cerning Two New Siences') will Galileo diese These widerlegen und zugleich sein eige-
nes Fallgesetz beweisen, nach dem alle Körper sich im freien Fall gleich schnell bewe-
gen, wie schwer sie auch sein mögen. Im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes wird dargelegt, dass 
Galileos Argumente gegen Aristoteles aber durchaus zweifelhaft sind; der zweite Teil 
stellt darüber hinaus in Frage, ob das Gedankenexperiment wirklich den Schluss auf 
Galileos Fallgesetz erlaubt, bzw. ob eine solche apriorische Herleitung überhaupt 
denkbar wäre.. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the chapter entitled 'First Day,' of 'Dialogues Concerning Two New 
Sciences' (1638), Galileo orchestrates a discussion about Aristotle's natural 
philosophy between a fictitious master, Salviati (who famously stands for 
Galileo himself), and his two students, Sagredo and Simplicio (the latter 
often serving as Aristotle's advocate). They focus especially on Aristotle's 
assumption that 
bodies of different weight […] move in one and the same medium 
with different speeds which stand to one another in the same ratio as 
the weights; so that, for example, a body which is ten times as heavy 
as another will move ten times as rapidly as the other. (Galileo 1954: 
61)1 
Salviati's (i.e., Galileo's) stance is that "we may deny [Aristotle's] assump-
tions." (Galileo 1954: 61). 
 As presented, the first reason for doing so, for denying Aristotle’s 
assumptions, is voiced by the young Sagredo, who claims to have made the 
empirical test and to have observed that Aristotle is wrong (cf. Galileo 
1954: 62).2 Having thus given founding expression to the modern scientific 
method, Galileo allows the master, Salviati to further add that "even without 
further experiment, it is possible to prove clearly, by means of a short and 
conclusive argument, that a heavier body does not move more rapidly than a 
lighter one […]." (Galileo 1954: 62; my emphasis) 
Before examining his argument in detail, I note that it is indeed 
possible to show "without further experiment" that an allegedly true law 
statement is incorrect and does not therefore state a law of nature. Granted, 
at first glance this fact may seem odd, especially so as the spirit of modern 
science is to progress via experimental confirmation or refutation. 
Nonetheless, there is a way to show "without further experiment," that a law 
hypothesis is wrong: that is, by showing that it is self-contradictory or that it 
entails contradictory statements. In what follows I will argue that Galileo's 
                                                
1 Note that when I speak about Aristotle I entirely rely on what Galileo reports Aristotle to 
have said. 
2 More important, in the chapter "Third Day" (cf. esp. Galileo 1954: 175) we find Galileo's 
meticulous descriptions of his inclined plane experiments. At this place he proves the cor-
rect law of free falling bodies, namely that "the free motion of a heavy falling body is con-
tinuously accelerated […] The distances traversed, during equal intervals of time, by a body 
falling from rest, stand to one another in the same ratio as the odd numbers beginning with 
unity." (Galileo 1954: 153) 
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argument succeeds in demonstrating only that Aristotle's law strongly 
suggests a self-contradiction but not that it strictly entails one and that 
defensive strategies against his argument are therefore possible. Acting as 
Aristotle’s advocate I will show how his assumptions might be defended 
(Part I). 
At the end of his proof, Galileo claims something even stronger. He 
concludes: "we infer therefore that large and small bodies [heavy and light 
bodies; MAS] move with the same speed," (Galileo 1954: 64)3—a 
formulation of his own Law of Falling Bodies. Yet if I am right and Galileo 
does not first succeed in refuting Aristotle's law, then a fortiori, he cannot 
establish his own law. Further again, I will demonstrate, that even if we 
were to assume the success of his first task Galileo’s second claim, his law, 
still does not follow from that refutation alone but rather has need of further 
assumptions.4  
As an aside it is noted that success on Galileo's part would amount to 
an a priori proof of a law hypothesis with empirical content. Whilst I do not 
wish to involve myself here in any argument as to whether such a thing is at 
all possible, I note that it would strike the empirically minded as very 
doubtful indeed. 
When considering Galileo’s argument some philosophers, like James 
Robert Brown (Brown 2000) or Simon Blackburn (Blackburn 1996), have 
accepted Galileo's proof (or parts of it). In his article on Thought 
Experiments in Blackwell's Companion to the Philosophy of Science Brown 
writes: "Galileo showed that all bodies fall at the same speed with a brilliant 
thought experiment that started by destroying the then reigning Aristotelian 
account." (Brown 2000: 529) After a reconstruction of Galileo's argument 
Brown, I believe wrongly, concludes  
That's the end of Aristotle's theory; but there is a bonus, since the right 
account is now obvious: they all fall at the same speed […] This is 
said to be a priori (though still fallible) knowledge of nature, since no 
new data are involved, nor is the conclusion derived from old data, nor 
is it some sort of logical truth. (Brown 2000: 529) 
Blackburn is more cautious. First of all he only thinks that Galileo refutes 
the Aristotelian view "that a heavy body falls faster than a lighter one" 
without claiming that Galileo also proves his own law and, secondly, 
Blackburn presents Galileo's proof in a slightly altered form from the 
                                                
3 The quote continues: "provided they are of the same specific gravity" where Galileo 
means density by "gravity" (compare (Galileo 1954: 68ff) ). Since we are concerned with 
free falling bodies the gravity of bodies can be disregarded. 
4 Which are, I have to concede, very likely to be accepted by many people. 
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original and in so doing weakens the defensive strategy that I propose. I will 
outline his reformulation at a later point.5 
 
 
PART I  
Let me return to Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio. Before he starts his proof, 
Salviati adds to Aristotle's main claim6 that its speed is a fixed value for 
each body: "each falling body acquires a definite speed fixed by nature, a 
velocity which cannot be increased or decreased or diminished except by the 
use of force or resistance," (Galileo 1954: 62-3). Then Salviati's main argu-
ment begins. He illustrates that Aristotle's claim apparently leads to two 
mutually contradictory consequences so that it can be rejected by reductio. 
Here is the first part:  
(GALILEO1) If then we take two bodies whose natural speeds are 
different, it is clear that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be 
partly retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat 
hastened by the swifter. (Galileo 1954: 63) 
He adds a quantitative reformulation: 
If a large stone moves with a speed of, say, eight while a smaller 
moves with a speed of four, then when they are united, the system will 
move with a speed less than eight… (Galileo 1954: 63) 
And here is the second, contradicting part: 
(GALILEO2) … but the two stones when tied together make a stone 
larger than that which before moved with the speed of eight. Hence 
the heavier body [i.e., the new which consists of the two former ones; 
MAS] moves with less speed than the lighter [i.e., the former heavier 
one; MAS]; an effect which is contrary to your supposition. (Galileo 
1954: 63)7 
Reductio complete: 
Thus you see how, from your assumption [directed to Simplicio; 
                                                
5 I must mention papers by Gendler (1998) and Norton (1996) who make, in a larger con-
text and thus previously unknown to me, points similar to those I am going to present. 
6 "Bodies of different weight […] move in one and the same medium with different speeds 
which stand to one another in the same ratio as the weights" 
7 Actually, next to speed and weight Galileo uses the concepts large and small. I identify 
large with heavy and small with light to simplify the argument. I believe that Galileo's 
proof is thereby not altered. Also, I will use the terms 'mass' and 'weight' interchangeably. 
Their difference—a weight is the gravitational force a mass experiences in a gravitational 
field—has no direct bearing on the argumentation. 
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MAS] that the heavier body moves more rapidly than the lighter one, I 
infer that the heavier body moves more slowly. (Galileo 1954: 63) 
In due course I will show not only how Aristotle could answer this 
challenge, but also how a counterargument proposed by Galileo—in the 
guise of Simplicio—unwittingly almost succeeds in refuting the argument 
by Salviati.  
As an appetiser for the serious argumentation against Galileo's proof 
consider the following story: 
Little Aristotle argues: "A bigger portion of ice cream is better than a 
smaller one (within certain limits)."   "That's not correct,", his younger 
cousin Galileo answers, "they all have the same quality!".   His argu-
ment is this: "The small portion together with the big portion (fill both 
portions from their old bowls into a new one) is better than the former 
big one, because it is even bigger. But, at the same time, it is less good 
since we have to take the average of the big and the small one's quality, 
i.e., the low quality of the small will reduce the high quality of the for-
mer big one. Reductio complete, bigger ice cream portions are—
contrary to what you think, Aristotle—not better than smaller ones. 
They all have the same quality." Speaks thus. He no doubt reaches for 
the bigger portion and tries to leave Aristotle with the small one. 
I now turn to the serious argument. To achieve my aim it is helpful to 
translate each of Aristotle's claims into a semi-formal language. 
Aristotle's and Galileo's starting points are these: 
0 ARISTOTLE0: "Each falling body [weight, 
MAS] acquires a definite speed fixed by 
nature." (Galileo 1954: 62-3) 
(Theorem 0 is presupposed by Theorem 1 
but does not enter the argument itself 
explicitly.) 
∀w∃s( S(w)=s ) with s being a speed and 
w being the weight of a certain body. 
1 ARISTOTLE1: "Bodies of different weight 
[…] move in one and the same medium 
with different speeds which stand to one 
another in the same ratio as the weights so 
that, for example, a body which is ten 
times as heavy as another will move ten 
times as rapidly as the other. (Galileo 
1954: 61) 
∀w∀w* ( w/w* = S(w)/S(w*) ); with w 
and w* being weights of two different 
bodies, S(w) and S(w*) their speeds. 
 
1* ARISTOTLE1*: A consequence of 1 which 
goes into the argument (instead of 1 itself) 
∀w∀w* ( w>w* ⊃ S(w)>S(w*) ) 
2 GALILEO1: "If then we take two bodies 
whose natural speeds are different, it is 
clear that on uniting the two, the more 
rapid one will be partly retarded by the 
slower, and the slower will be somewhat 
hastened by the swifter." (Galileo 1954: 
∀w∀w* ( S(w)>S(w*) ⊃ 
S(w)>S(w+w*)>S(w*) ) 
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63) 
3 GALILEO2: "The two stones when tied 
together make a stone larger than [the 
biggest of the two; MAS]." (Galileo 1954: 
63)8 
∀w∀w* (w>w* ⊃ w+w*> w ) 
 
  
Now, Galileo's proof reads like this: 
 
4 Premise w1 > w2 
5 From 4, 1* S(w1) > S(w2) 
6 From 5, 2 S(w1) > S(w1 + w2) > S(w2) 
7 From 3, 4 w1 + w2 > w1  
8 From 7, 1*: contradiction to 6 S(w1 + w2) > S(w1) 
 
A main element of this reductio is that speeds combine to average (cf. 2), 
where weights add (cf. 3). This would be impossible however if speed were 
directly proportional to weight, (cf. 1*). 
I said, when I announced my counterargument, that Galileo's proof 
only suggests the failure of Aristotle's assumption but that the failure does 
not strictly follow. That it prima facie leads to success is undeniable. Here is 
why it does, nonetheless, ultimately fail: 
What we can conclude from the formal proof is only that at least one 
of the premises 1* (ARISTOTLE1*), 2 (GALILEO1), 3 (GALILEO2), or 4 must be 
rejected or amended. 1* is, of course, the premise Galileo chooses to reject, 
since 2 and 3 are just tailored for this purpose. But this is not cogent.  
We can also argue against 2 (GALILEO1): if we combine two bodies, 
a heavier w1 and a lighter one w2, to one bigger body w1+w2, then, if this is 
properly done and really one body is the result, this bigger body W=w1+w2 
has its own natural speed which is, according to Aristotle's claim, higher 
than the speed of the former heavier body w1 (and a fortiori higher than the 
speed of the former lighter body w2). Hence, contrary to 2 (GALILEO1) and 
6: S(W) > S(w1) > S(w2). 
If, on the other hand, the two bodies are still two bodies after having 
tied them together—that is, the unification has not been done properly—
then the slower one will retard the quicker and vice versa. In this case, the 
masses do not add to a bigger sum, i.e., there is no entity which has the 
weight W=w1+w2, and, hence, a higher speed. Contrary to 3 (GALILEO2) and 
7: the sum w1+w2 does just not exist. 
                                                
8 Needless to say that ∀i (mi > 0). 
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 Against 4 we can't really argue. 4 is an exemplification of our com-
mon belief that there are at least two different bodies with two different 
masses. 
 Arguing against 2 and 3 in the above way, we take the sting out of 
Galileo's argument. We are not confronted with a reduction anymore, but 
rather with the question whether the resulting speed is to be calculated by  
s3 = S(w1 plus w2) = S(w1 + w2) = S(W) 
or by 
 s3* = S(w1) plus S(w2) = (S(w1) + S(w2))/2 = (s1 + s2)/2 
where s3 > s3*. The answer depends on whether the two bodies have been 
properly united to one single body or not. 
The problem is then to spell out exactly what would constitute a 
proper unification of bodies. It is precisely our lack of clarity on this issue 
that lends such credibility to Galileo’s proof on first inspection. Indeed, 
Blackburn’s reformulation of Galileo’s proof serves to further underline that 
difficulty. In his Dictionary of Philosophy under the entry ‘Thought Ex-
periments’ Blackburn writes  
[Galileo] asks us to imagine a heavy body made into the shape of a 
dumbbell and the connecting rod gradually made thinner, until it is 
finally severed. The thing is one heavy body until the last moment, 
and then two light ones, but it is incredible that this final snip alters 
the velocity dramatically." (Blackburn 1996: 377)9 
I concede that our immediate intuition here is that once the two sides of the 
dumbbell (this one body) are separated, we have two bodies. 
In summary then, I have so far shown that although Galileo's proof 
strongly suggests the failure of Aristotle's law of free falling bodies it is not 
logically decisive. For his proof to be conclusively dismissed however, we 
need a solid criterion by which to establish when two or more bodies are 
properly united.  
Yet, it is Galileo himself who gives us an idea how to achieve that 
aim. He lets Simplicio put forward his doubts against Salviati and provides 
thereby (and unbeknownst to himself) the needed criterion.  
Simplicio challenges GALILEO1: 
                                                
9 We could, as another defence strategy, state the nearly unbelievable, namely, that, in fact, 
the resulting two bodies will slow down instantaneously after the final snip (note that 
Blackburn himself says that it is "incredible" to believe in a dramatic velocity change; not 
that it is absolutely inconceivable.) That this is not sustainable is very clear, but for empiri-
cal reasons. Galileo's proof would have to resort to empirical data at this point and would 
no longer be a proof "without further experiments". 
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It appears to me that the smaller stone when added to the larger 
increases its weight and by adding weight I do not see how it can fail 
to increase its speed or, at least, not to diminish it. (Galileo 1954: 63) 
Weight, so I read in Simplicio's words, is the ultimate unit that has to be 
determined first; speed comes second. And this is close to saying that when 
really one body is the result, there aren't any lower speeds to be added (that 
is averaged) anymore. 
Salviati's answer to this objection is that tying a small body on top of 
a large body only adds weight if the stones are at rest: 
A large stone placed in a balance not only acquires additional weight 
by having another stone placed upon it, but even by the addition of a 
handful of hemp its weight is augmented. (Galileo 1954: 63) 
In motion, however, 
do you think that the hemp will press down upon the stone and thus 
accelerate its motion or do you think the motion will be retarded by a 
partial upward pressure? […] You must therefore conclude that, 
during free and natural fall, the small stone does not press upon the 
larger and consequently does not increase its weight as it does when at 
rest. (Galileo 1954: 64) 
So here is Galileo spelling out one possible criterion for when a proper 
weight addition (a body unification) is achieved and when it is not: viz., you 
cannot unite two bodies / weights (or cut one into two) while they are fal-
ling; if you want to unite two bodies to one single one the two bodies have 
to be at rest. Now, there is no contradiction between GALILEO1 and 
GALILEO2 anymore: either you put the two stones together while still resting, 
then they—together as one body—acquire a higher speed when you let them 
fall (contra GALILEO1); or you put them together while falling and GALILEO2 
turns out to be false. 
I want to underline that this criterion for united bodies does not of 
course immunise Aristotle's theory against all attack. One will find in an 
experiment that two stones, which are united while at rest, fall nearly 
precisely like two stones that are united while falling. This is, however, an 
empirical finding and does not count anymore as "argument without further 
experiment". 
Finally, I concede that our intuition about Blackburn's dumbbell are 
clearly contrary to this artificial criterion. Galileo's argument is very sugges-
tive. It is, however, not logically compelling.10 
                                                
10 It is, of course, possible to invent other criteria for proper body fusions and fissions—at 
full moon, 6am; when glued together with superglue; chained; etc.—which would decide 
over the question whether their weights can be added and create a new natural speed or not. 
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PART II 
I now turn to my final section. Galileo concludes the whole quarrel 
not by saying that Aristotle is wrong and hence by declaring that it is not 
true that "bodies of different weight […] move in one and the same medium 
with different speeds which stand to one another in the same ratio as the 
weights", but with the even stronger claim that "we infer therefore that large 
and small bodies [heavy and light bodies; MAS] move with the same 
speed." (Galileo 1954: 64) This is Galileo's own law of gravitation. It was 
not the initial goal of Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio's discussion to prove 
it. My claims in Part II are: (A) that he does not succeed to prove his own 
law and (B) that it would count against a still appreciated empiricist dogma 
if he could do it in this way. 
 
 
Starting with (A), let us suppose, contrary to what I have shown in 
Part I, that Galileo successfully proved Aristotle wrong. There would then 
of course be innumerable options left as to what bodies might do when 
falling. Perhaps, for example, bodies of different weight might move with 
different speeds that stand to one another in the opposite ratio as the 
weights, i.e. lighter bodies would fall faster than heavier bodies. Or worse 
again, perhaps different bodies could do different things. The negation of 
Aristotle's 'bodies of different weight […] move […] with different speeds' 
states that 'not all bodies of different weight move with different speeds'. In 
short then, the most that Galileo succeeds in demonstrating is that there are 
some bodies that do not accord to Aristotle's law.11 
Hence, the first of my doubts is confirmed: Galileo's proof does not, 
as it stands, establish his famous 'Law of Falling Bodies' (apart from the fact 
that my Part I has already shown that Galileo did not refute Aristotle and 
therefore did—a fortiori—not establish his own law). 
 
Before considering (B), the 'cannot' part of my goal, I want to 
consider an amendment of Galileo's proof. Lets—contrary to the facts—take 
for granted that Galileo did succeed in proving Aristotle wrong.  
                                                
11 I suspect that one could run Galileo's argument again with Aristotle's law in existentially 
quantified form: 'there are two bodies, one heavier, one lighter, such that the heavier falls 
faster than the lighter'. The result would be the negation, i.e., 'there aren't any such bodies' 
(provided, of course, we buy the general argument structure). 
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Then we could get his own law in two further steps. (i) By running 
through the argument again exchanging all instances of 'faster' by 'slower' 
and vice versa (which would reflect an anti-Aristotelian law). Thereby we 
would establish that not all bodies fall with speeds which stand in opposite 
relation to the weights. If we finally (ii) suppose that nature is uniform and 
the speed of all bodies is fixed in the very same way (whatever that way is) 
we have to conclude that they all—no matter what their weight is—fall with 
the same speeds: Galileo's own law. 12 
  
Turning now finally to (B), to my claim that Galileo not only does 
not, but also cannot prove his own law. What if Galileo did succeed with his 
proof? Then he would have shown a law with empirical content "without 
further experiment". Yet, even if some law hypotheses are formulated on the 
basis of pure thought we feel that we either need empirical tests to confirm 
them or empirical data have been presupposed tacitly. This is why I believe 
Galileo could not achieve his goal with such a kind of proof13 and Galileo 
might even agree. It was he after all who taught us an empiricist lesson 
against the Aristotelian creed. Indeed, before he comes up with his proof 
Galileo (alias Sagredo) assures us that he has shown the validity of his law 
already empirically: 
I […] who have made the test can assure you that a cannon ball 
weighing one or two hundred pounds, or even more, will not reach the 
                                                
12 Here's the formal proof against anti-Aristotle: 
1*' ∀w∀w* ( w>w* ⊃ S(w)<S(w*) ) New 1* 
2 ∀w∀w* ( S(w)>S(w*) ⊃ 
S(w)>S(w+w*)>S(w*) ) 
Unchanged 2 
3 ∀w∀w* ( w+w*>w* ) Unchanged 3 
4 w1 > w2 Premise 
5 S(w1) < S(w2) 4, 1*' 
6 S(w1) < S(w1 + w2) < S(w2) 5, 2 
7 w1 + w2 > w1 3, 4 
8 S(w1 + w2) < S(w1) 7, 1*': Contradiction to 6 
 
From the original argument we (supposedly) get that  
¬∀w∀w*( w>w* ⊃ S(w)>S(w*) ); i.e., 
∃w∃w*( w>w* ∧ S(w) ≤ S(w*) ) 
from the altered argument that  
¬∀w∀w*( w>w* ⊃ S(w)<S(w*) ); 
∃w∃w*( w>w* ∧ S(w) ≥ S(w*) ) 
and therefore—with the uniformity assumption—that  
∀w∀w* (S(w)=S(w*)): 
Galileo's own law. 
13 That is, unless there is some sort of empirical input tacitly included in his arguments. 
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ground by as much as a span ahead of a musket ball weighing only 
half a pound, provided both are dropped from a height of 200 cubits." 
(Galileo 1954: 62; my emphasis) 
I let Galileo have the last word on this issue: 
Among the safe ways to pursue truth is the putting of experience be-
fore any reasoning, we being sure that any fallacy will be contained in 
the latter, at least covertly, it not being possible that a sensible experi-
ence is contrary to truth. And this also is a precept much esteemed by 
Aristotle and placed [by him] far in front of the value and force of the 
authority of everybody in the world. (From a letter to Fortunio Liceti, 
September 1640, here quoted from (Drake 1978: 409)) 
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